Service A provides a data retrieval capability that can be used by a range of service consumers, including Service Consumer A .In order to retrieve the necessary data, Service Consumer A first sends a request message to Service A (1). Service A then exchanges request and response messages with Service B (2, 3), Service C (4, 5), and Service D (6. 7). After receiving all three response messages from Services B .C .and D, Service A assembles the collected data into a response message that it returns to Service Consumer A (8). The owner of Service A charges service consumers for each usage of the data retrieval capability. Recently, the owner of Service Consumer A has complained that the data returned by Service A is incorrect, incomplete, and from invalid sources. As evidence, the Service Consumer A owner has presented the owner of Service A with sample messages containing the incorrect and incomplete contents. As a result, the Service Consumer A owner has refused to pay the usage fees. Subsequent to an internal investigation, the owner of Service A determines that the data returned by Service A is consistently correct and complete. There are suspicions that the Service Consumer A owner is altering the original messages and issuing these complaints fraudulently in order to avoid paying the usage fees. How can the owner of Service A prove that Service A is returning correct and complete data and that this data originated from the correct sources?

Answer : B
Services A, B and C belong to Service Inventory A .Services D, E and F belong to Service Inventory B .Service C acts as an authentication broker for Service Inventory A .Service F acts as an authentication broker for Service Inventory B .Both of the authentication brokers use Kerberos-based authentication technologies. Upon receiving a request message from a service consumer, Services C and F authenticate the request using a local identity store and then use a separate Ticket Granting Service (not shown) to issue the Kerberos ticket to the service consumer. Currently, tickets issued in one service inventory are not valid in the other. For example, if Service A wants to communicate with Services D or E, it must request a ticket from the Service Inventory B authentication broker (Service F). Because Service Inventory A and B trust each other, the current cross-inventory authentication is considered unnecessarily redundant. How can these service inventory architectures be improved to avoid redundant authentication?

Answer : C
Service Consumer A sends a request to Service A (1). Service A replies with an acknowledgement message (2) and then processes the request and sends a request message to Service B (3). This message contains confidential financial data. Service B sends three different request messages together with its security credentials to Services C, D, and E (4, 5, 6). Upon successful authentication, Services C, D, and E store the data from the message in separate databases (7, 8, 9) Services B, C, D, and E belong to Service Inventory A, which further belongs to Organization B .Service Consumer A and Service A belong to Organization A .The service contracts of Services A and B both comply with the same XML schema. However, each organization employs different security technologies for their service architectures. To protect the confidential financial data sent by Service A to Service B, each organization decides to independently apply the Data Confidentiality and the Data Origin Authentication patterns to establish message-layer security for external message exchanges. However, when an encrypted and digitally signed test message is sent by Service A to Service B, Service B was unable to decrypt the message. Which of the following statements describes a solution that solves this problem?

Answer : A
Service A has two specific service consumers, Service Consumer A and Service Consumer B (1). Both service consumers are required to provide security credentials in order for Service A to perform authentication using an identity store (2). If a service consumer's request message is successfully authenticated, Service A processes the request by exchanging messages with Service B (3) and then Service C (4). With each of these message exchanges, Service A collects data necessary to perform a query against historical data stored in a proprietary legacy system. Service A's request to the legacy system must be authenticated (5). The legacy system only provides access control using a single account. If the request from Service A is permitted, it will be able to access all of the data stored in the legacy system. If the request is not permitted, none of the data stored in the legacy system can be accessed. Upon successfully retrieving the requested data (6), Service A generates a response message that is sent back to either Service Consumer A or B .The legacy system is also used independently by Service D without requiring any authentication. Furthermore, the legacy system has no auditing feature and therefore cannot record when data access from Service A or Service D occurs. If the legacy system encounters an error when processing a request, it generates descriptive error codes. This service composition architecture needs to be upgraded in order to fulfill the following new security requirements:
1. Service Consumers A and B have different permission levels, and therefore, response messages sent to a service consumer must only contain data for which the service consumer is authorized.
2. All data access requests made to the legacy system must be logged.
3. Services B and C must be provided with the identity of Service A's service consumer in order to provide Service A with the requested data.
4. Response messages generated by Service A cannot contain confidential error information about the legacy system. Which of the following statements provides solutions that satisfy these requirements?

Answer : B
Service A provides a data access capability that can be used by a variety of service consumers. The database records accessed by Service A are classified as either private or public. There are two types of service consumers that use Service A:
Service consumers with public access permissions (allowed to access only public data records) and service consumers with private access permissions (allowed to access all data records). For performance reasons the Service A architecture uses a single database, named Database A .Each record in Database A is classified as either private or public. After Service A is invoked by a service consumer (1), it authenticates the request message using an identity store and retrieves the corresponding authorization (2, 3). Once authorized, the service consumer's request is submitted to Database A (4), which then returns the requested data (5) If the service consumer has private access permissions, all of the returned data is included in Service A's response message (6). If the service consumer has public access permissions, then Service A first filters the data in order to remove all unauthorized private data records before sending to the response message to the service consumer (6). In addition to retrieving data, Service A's data access capability can be used to update database records. An investigation recently revealed an information leakage problem that can occur when service consumers with public access permissions attempt to update the ID value of a database record The ID values of all database records (private or public) must be unique. When a service consumer with public access permissions updates a public database record with an ID value that is already assigned to a private database record, the database returns an error message describing this conflict. This error text reveals confidential information by stating that the ID value submitted by the service consumer with public access permissions already exists within a private database record. What steps can be taken to avoid this problem while preserving the requirement that all database records (private and public) have unique ID values?

Answer : A
Service A provides a customized report generating capability. Due to infrastructure limitations, the number of service consumers permitted to access Service A concurrently is strictly controlled. Service A validates request messages based on the supplied credentials (1). If the authentication of the request message is successful, Service A sends a message to Service B (2) to retrieve the required data from Database A (3). Service A stores the response from Service B (4) in memory and then issues a request message to Service C (5). Service C retrieves a different set of data from Database A (6) and sends the result back to Service A (7). Service A consolidates the data received from Services B and C and sends the generated report in the response message to its service consumer (8).

This service composition was recently shut down after it was discovered that Database A had been successfully attacked twice in a row. The first type of attack consisted of a series of coordinated request messages sent by the same malicious service consumer, with the intention of triggering a range of exception conditions within the database in order to generate various error messages. The second type of attack consisted of a service consumer sending request messages with malicious input with the intention of gaining control over the database server. This attack resulted in the deletion of database records and tables. An investigation revealed that both attacks were carried out by malicious service consumers that were authorized. How can the service composition security architecture be improved to prevent these types of attacks?
Answer : C
Service A exchanges messages with Service B multiple times during the same runtime service activity. Communication between Services A and B has been secured using transport-layer security. With each service request message sent to Service B (1A .IB), Service A includes an X.509 certificate, signed by an external Certificate Authority (CA). Service B validates the certificate by retrieving the public key of the CA (2A .2B) and verifying the digital signature of the X.509 certificate. Service B then performs a certificate revocation check against a separate external CA repository (3A, 3B). No intermediary service agents reside between Service A and Service B .Service B has recently suffered from poor runtime performance plus it has been the victim of an access-oriented attack. As a result, its security architecture must be changed to fulfill the following new requirements:
1. The performance of security-related processing carried out by Service B when communicating with Service A must be improved.
2. All request messages sent from Service A to Service B must be screened to ensure that they do not contain malicious content. Which of the following statements describes a solution that fulfills these requirements?

Answer : B