HPE6-A78 Aruba Certified Network Security Associate Exam Practice Test

Answer : D

The Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer plays a crucial role within the Device Insight architecture by residing in the cloud and applying machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to the metadata sent by Collectors. This component of the architecture is responsible for analyzing vast amounts of data collected from the network to identify and classify devices accurately. By utilizing machine learning algorithms and crowdsourced input, the Device Insight Analyzer enhances the accuracy of device detection and classification, thereby improving the overall security and management of the network.

:

Aruba ClearPass official documentation and whitepapers that detail the functionality and deployment of the Device Insight Analyzer.

Technical articles and presentations on network security solutions that discuss the use of machine learning and data analytics in device management.

Answer : B

When setting up VLANs for a wireless solution with an Aruba Mobility Master (MM), Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs), and campus APs (CAPs), it is recommended to use wireless user roles to assign devices to different VLANs. This allows for greater flexibility and control over network resources and policies applied to different user groups. Wireless user roles can dynamically assign devices to the appropriate VLAN based on a variety of criteria such as user identity, device type, location, and the resources they need to access. This approach aligns with the ArubaOS features that leverage user roles for network access control, as detailed in Aruba's configuration and administration guides.

Answer : A

The vulnerability of an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, particularly when it comes to the risk of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, is a significant concern. In this scenario, a hacker can intercept the public values exchanged between two legitimate parties and substitute them with their own. This allows the attacker to decrypt or manipulate the messages passing between the two original parties without them knowing. This answer is based on the fundamental principles of how Diffie-Hellman key exchange works and its vulnerabilities without authentication mechanisms. Reference materials from cryptographic textbooks and security protocols detail these vulnerabilities, such as those found in standards and publications by organizations like NIST.

Answer : C

A digital chain of custody ensures that evidence (e.g., logs, timestamps) collected from a network can be reliably used in legal or forensic investigations. It requires maintaining the integrity and authenticity of data, including accurate timestamps for events. HPE Aruba Networking devices, such as Instant APs, Mobility Controllers (MCs), and AOS-CX switches, support features to help maintain a digital chain of custody.

Option C, 'Ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated NTP,' is correct. Accurate and synchronized time across all network devices is critical for maintaining a digital chain of custody. Timestamps in logs (e.g., authentication events, traffic logs) must be consistent and verifiable. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize device clocks, and authenticated NTP ensures that the time source is trusted and not tampered with (e.g., using MD5 or SHA authentication). This practice ensures that logs from different devices can be correlated accurately during an investigation.

Option A, 'Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) datapath on an ongoing basis,' is incorrect. While packet capturing on the datapath (user traffic) can provide detailed traffic data for analysis, enabling it on an ongoing basis is impractical due to storage and performance constraints. Packet captures are typically used for specific troubleshooting or investigations, not for maintaining a chain of custody.

Option B, 'Ensure that all network infrastructure devices use RADIUS rather than TACACS+ to authenticate managers,' is incorrect. The choice of RADIUS or TACACS+ for manager authentication does not directly impact the digital chain of custody. Both protocols can log authentication events, but the protocol used does not ensure the integrity of timestamps or evidence.

Option D, 'Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) controlpath on an ongoing basis,' is incorrect for similar reasons as Option A. Control path (control plane) packet captures include management traffic (e.g., between APs and MCs), but enabling them continuously is not practical and does not directly contribute to maintaining a chain of custody. Accurate timestamps in logs are more relevant.

The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:

'Maintaining a digital chain of custody requires ensuring the integrity and authenticity of network logs and events. A critical practice is to ensure that all network infrastructure devices, such as Mobility Controllers and AOS-CX switches, receive a valid and synchronized clock using authenticated NTP. Use the command ntp server <ip-address> key <key-id> to configure authenticated NTP, ensuring that timestamps in logs are accurate and verifiable for forensic investigations.' (Page 85, Digital Chain of Custody Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

'Accurate time synchronization is essential for maintaining a digital chain of custody. Configure all devices to use authenticated NTP to synchronize their clocks with a trusted time source. This ensures that event logs, such as authentication and traffic logs, have consistent and reliable timestamps, which can be correlated across devices during an investigation.' (Page 380, Time Synchronization Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Digital Chain of Custody Section, Page 85.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Time Synchronization Section, Page 380.

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Answer : C

In an AOS-CX switch environment, 802.1X authentication is used to authenticate clients connecting to ports, and roles are assigned based on the authentication outcome and configuration. The roles mentioned in the question---fallback, auth, and critical---have specific purposes in the AOS-CX port-access configuration:

Auth role (roleB): This role is applied when a client successfully authenticates via 802.1X and no specific role is assigned by the RADIUS server (e.g., via an Aruba-User-Role VSA). It is the default role for successful authentication.

Fallback role (roleA): This role is applied when no authentication method is attempted (e.g., the client does not support 802.1X or MAC authentication and no other method is configured).

Critical role (roleC): This role is applied when the switch cannot contact the RADIUS server (e.g., during a server timeout or failure), allowing the client to have limited access in a 'critical' state.

In this scenario, the client successfully authenticates via 802.1X, and CPPM does not send an Aruba-User-Role VSA. Since authentication is successful, the switch applies the auth role (roleB) as the default role for successful authentication when no specific role is provided by the RADIUS server.

Option A, 'The client receives roleC,' is incorrect because the critical role is only applied when the RADIUS server is unreachable, which is not the case here since authentication succeeded.

Option B, 'The client is denied access,' is incorrect because the client successfully authenticated, so access is granted with the appropriate role.

Option D, 'The client receives roleA,' is incorrect because the fallback role is applied only when no authentication is attempted, not when authentication succeeds.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

'When a client successfully authenticates using 802.1X, the switch assigns the client to the auth role configured for the port, unless the RADIUS server specifies a different role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. If no Aruba-User-Role VSA is present in the Access-Accept message, the auth role is applied.' (Page 132, 802.1X Authentication Section)

Additionally, the guide clarifies the roles:

'Auth role: Applied after successful 802.1X or MAC authentication if no role is specified by the RADIUS server.'

'Fallback role: Applied when no authentication method is attempted.'

'Critical role: Applied when the RADIUS server is unavailable.' (Page 134, Port-Access Roles Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, 802.1X Authentication Section, Page 132.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Port-Access Roles Section, Page 134.

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Answer : D

A honeypot in the context of wireless networks is a rogue access point (AP) set up by an attacker to lure wireless clients into connecting to it, often to steal credentials, intercept traffic, or launch further attacks. A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack involves the attacker positioning themselves between the client and the legitimate network to intercept or manipulate traffic.

Option D, 'It examines wireless clients' probes and broadcasts the SSIDs in the probes, so that wireless clients will connect to it automatically,' is correct. Wireless clients periodically send probe requests to discover available networks, including SSIDs they have previously connected to (stored in their Preferred Network List, PNL). A honeypot AP can capture these probe requests, identify the SSIDs the client is looking for, and then broadcast those SSIDs. If the honeypot AP has a stronger signal or the legitimate AP is not available, the client may automatically connect to the honeypot AP (especially if the SSID is in the PNL and auto-connect is enabled). Once connected, the attacker can intercept the client's traffic, making this an effective MITM attack.

Option A, 'It uses ARP poisoning to disconnect wireless clients from the legitimate wireless network and force clients to connect to the hacker's wireless network instead,' is incorrect. ARP poisoning is a technique used on wired networks (or within the same broadcast domain) to redirect traffic by spoofing ARP responses. In a wireless context, ARP poisoning is not typically used to disconnect clients from a legitimate AP. Instead, techniques like deauthentication attacks or SSID spoofing (as in Option D) are more common.

Option B, 'It runs an NMap scan on the wireless client to find the client's MAC and IP address. The hacker then connects to another network and spoofs those addresses,' is incorrect. NMap scans are used for network discovery and port scanning, not for launching an MITM attack via a honeypot. Spoofing MAC and IP addresses on another network does not position the attacker as a honeypot to intercept wireless traffic.

Option C, 'It uses a combination of software and hardware to jam the RF band and prevent the client from connecting to any wireless networks,' is incorrect. Jamming the RF band would disrupt all wireless communication, including the attacker's honeypot, and would not facilitate an MITM attack. Jamming might be used in a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, but not for MITM.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

'A common technique for launching a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack using a honeypot AP involves capturing wireless clients' probe requests to identify SSIDs in their Preferred Network List (PNL). The honeypot AP then broadcasts these SSIDs, tricking clients into connecting automatically if the SSID matches a known network and auto-connect is enabled. Once connected, the attacker can intercept the client's traffic, performing an MITM attack.' (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

'Honeypot APs can be used to launch MITM attacks by spoofing SSIDs that clients are probing for. Clients often automatically connect to known SSIDs in their PNL, especially if the legitimate AP is unavailable or the honeypot AP has a stronger signal, allowing the attacker to intercept traffic.' (Page 72, Wireless MITM Attacks Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Wireless Threats Section, Page 422.

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Wireless MITM Attacks Section, Page 72.

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Answer : A

The exhibit shows an error in the CPPM Event Viewer: 'RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD 10.1.10.8:1812.' This indicates that a new HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller (MC) is attempting to send RADIUS authentication requests to HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), but CPPM does not recognize the MC as a Network Access Device (NAD), resulting in the authentication failure.

Unknown NAD Error: In CPPM, a NAD is a device (e.g., an MC, switch, or AP) that sends RADIUS requests to CPPM for authentication. Each NAD must be configured in CPPM with its IP address and a shared secret. The error 'unknown NAD 10.1.10.8:1812' means that the IP address 10.1.10.8 (the source IP of the MC's RADIUS request) is not listed as a NAD in CPPM's configuration, so CPPM rejects the request.

Option A, 'That the IP address that the MC is using to reach CPPM matches the one defined for the device on CPPM,' is correct. You need to check that the MC's IP address (10.1.10.8) is correctly configured as a NAD in CPPM. In CPPM, go to Configuration > Network > Devices, and verify that a NAD entry exists for 10.1.10.8. If the IP address does not match (e.g., due to NAT, a different interface, or a misconfiguration), CPPM will reject the request as coming from an unknown NAD.

Option B, 'That the MC has valid admin credentials configured on it for logging into the CPPM,' is incorrect. Admin credentials on the MC are used for management access (e.g., SSH, web UI), not for RADIUS authentication. RADIUS communication between the MC and CPPM uses a shared secret, not admin credentials.

Option C, 'That the MC has been added as a domain machine on the Active Directory domain with which CPPM is synchronized,' is incorrect. Adding the MC as a domain machine in Active Directory (AD) is relevant only if the MC itself is authenticating users against AD (e.g., for machine authentication), but this is not required for the MC to act as a NAD sending RADIUS requests to CPPM.

Option D, 'That the shared secret configured for the CPPM authentication server matches the one defined for the device on CPPM,' is incorrect in this context. While a shared secret mismatch would cause authentication failures, it would not result in an 'unknown NAD' error. The 'unknown NAD' error occurs before the shared secret is checked, as CPPM does not recognize the IP address as a valid NAD.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

'The error 'RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD <IP-address>' in the Event Viewer indicates that the IP address of the device sending the RADIUS request (e.g., a Mobility Controller) is not configured as a Network Access Device (NAD) in ClearPass. To resolve this, go to Configuration > Network > Devices in the CPPM UI, and ensure that the IP address of the device (e.g., 10.1.10.8) is added as a NAD with the correct shared secret. The IP address used by the device to reach CPPM must match the one defined in the NAD configuration.' (Page 302, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

'When configuring a Mobility Controller to use ClearPass as a RADIUS server, ensure that the MC's IP address is added as a NAD in ClearPass. If ClearPass logs an 'unknown NAD' error, verify that the IP address the MC uses to send RADIUS requests (e.g., the source IP of the request) matches the IP address configured in ClearPass under Configuration > Network > Devices.' (Page 498, Configuring RADIUS Authentication Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section, Page 302.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Configuring RADIUS Authentication Section, Page 498.

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