HP Aruba Certified Network Security Associate HPE6-A78 Exam Practice Test

Answer : D

The AOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP) in an AOS-8 architecture (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) is designed to detect and mitigate wireless threats, such as rogue APs and unauthorized clients. WIP classifies clients and APs based on their behavior and status in the network.

Authorized Client Definition: In the context of WIP, an 'Authorized' client is one that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP (an AP managed by the MC and part of the company's network) and is actively passing encrypted traffic. This typically means the client has completed 802.1X authentication (e.g., in a WPA3-Enterprise network) or PSK authentication (e.g., in a WPA3-Personal network) and is communicating securely with the AP.

Option D, 'A client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and passed encrypted traffic,' is correct. This matches the WIP definition of an Authorized client: the client must authenticate to an AP that is classified as 'Authorized' (i.e., part of the company's network) and must be passing encrypted traffic, indicating a secure connection (e.g., using WPA3 encryption).

Option A, 'A client that is on the WIP whitelist,' is incorrect. WIP does not use a client whitelist for classification. The AP whitelist is used to authorize APs, not clients. Client classification (e.g., Authorized, Interfering) is based on their authentication status and connection to authorized APs.

Option B, 'A client that has a certificate issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA),' is incorrect. While a certificate might be used for 802.1X authentication (e.g., EAP-TLS), WIP does not classify clients as Authorized based on their certificate status. The classification depends on successful authentication to an authorized AP and encrypted traffic.

Option C, 'A client that is NOT on the WIP blacklist,' is incorrect. WIP does use blacklisting (e.g., for clients that violate security policies), but being 'not on the blacklist' does not make a client Authorized. A client must actively authenticate to an authorized AP and pass encrypted traffic to be classified as Authorized.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

'In the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system, an 'Authorized' client is defined as a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and is passing encrypted traffic. An authorized AP is one that is managed by the Mobility Controller and part of the company's network. For example, a client that completes 802.1X authentication to an authorized AP using WPA3-Enterprise and sends encrypted traffic is classified as Authorized.' (Page 414, WIP Client Classification Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

'WIP classifies clients as 'Authorized' if they have authenticated to an authorized AP and are passing encrypted traffic, indicating a secure connection. Clients that are not authenticated or are connected to rogue or neighbor APs are classified as 'Interfering' or other categories, depending on their behavior.' (Page 78, WIP Classifications Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, WIP Client Classification Section, Page 414.

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, WIP Classifications Section, Page 78.

Answer : C

When configuring an ArubaOS-CX switch to send RADIUS debug messages to a central SIEM server, it is important to correctly direct these debug outputs. The command debug radius all activates debugging for all RADIUS processes, capturing detailed logs about RADIUS operations. If the SIEM server is already defined on the switch for logging purposes (as indicated by the command logging 10.5.6.12), the correct destination for these debug messages to be sent to the SIEM server would be through the syslog. This ensures that all generated logs are forwarded to the centralized server specified for logging, enabling consistent log management and analysis. Using syslog as the destination leverages the existing logging setup and integrates seamlessly with the network's centralized monitoring systems.

Answer : A

The exhibit shows an error in the CPPM Event Viewer: 'RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD 10.1.10.8:1812.' This indicates that a new HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller (MC) is attempting to send RADIUS authentication requests to HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), but CPPM does not recognize the MC as a Network Access Device (NAD), resulting in the authentication failure.

Unknown NAD Error: In CPPM, a NAD is a device (e.g., an MC, switch, or AP) that sends RADIUS requests to CPPM for authentication. Each NAD must be configured in CPPM with its IP address and a shared secret. The error 'unknown NAD 10.1.10.8:1812' means that the IP address 10.1.10.8 (the source IP of the MC's RADIUS request) is not listed as a NAD in CPPM's configuration, so CPPM rejects the request.

Option A, 'That the IP address that the MC is using to reach CPPM matches the one defined for the device on CPPM,' is correct. You need to check that the MC's IP address (10.1.10.8) is correctly configured as a NAD in CPPM. In CPPM, go to Configuration > Network > Devices, and verify that a NAD entry exists for 10.1.10.8. If the IP address does not match (e.g., due to NAT, a different interface, or a misconfiguration), CPPM will reject the request as coming from an unknown NAD.

Option B, 'That the MC has valid admin credentials configured on it for logging into the CPPM,' is incorrect. Admin credentials on the MC are used for management access (e.g., SSH, web UI), not for RADIUS authentication. RADIUS communication between the MC and CPPM uses a shared secret, not admin credentials.

Option C, 'That the MC has been added as a domain machine on the Active Directory domain with which CPPM is synchronized,' is incorrect. Adding the MC as a domain machine in Active Directory (AD) is relevant only if the MC itself is authenticating users against AD (e.g., for machine authentication), but this is not required for the MC to act as a NAD sending RADIUS requests to CPPM.

Option D, 'That the shared secret configured for the CPPM authentication server matches the one defined for the device on CPPM,' is incorrect in this context. While a shared secret mismatch would cause authentication failures, it would not result in an 'unknown NAD' error. The 'unknown NAD' error occurs before the shared secret is checked, as CPPM does not recognize the IP address as a valid NAD.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

'The error 'RADIUS authentication attempt from unknown NAD <IP-address>' in the Event Viewer indicates that the IP address of the device sending the RADIUS request (e.g., a Mobility Controller) is not configured as a Network Access Device (NAD) in ClearPass. To resolve this, go to Configuration > Network > Devices in the CPPM UI, and ensure that the IP address of the device (e.g., 10.1.10.8) is added as a NAD with the correct shared secret. The IP address used by the device to reach CPPM must match the one defined in the NAD configuration.' (Page 302, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

'When configuring a Mobility Controller to use ClearPass as a RADIUS server, ensure that the MC's IP address is added as a NAD in ClearPass. If ClearPass logs an 'unknown NAD' error, verify that the IP address the MC uses to send RADIUS requests (e.g., the source IP of the request) matches the IP address configured in ClearPass under Configuration > Network > Devices.' (Page 498, Configuring RADIUS Authentication Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, Troubleshooting RADIUS Issues Section, Page 302.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Configuring RADIUS Authentication Section, Page 498.

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Answer : A

Control Plane Security (CPSec) is a feature in HPE Aruba Networking's AOS-8 architecture that secures the communication between Access Points (APs) and Mobility Controllers (MCs). The control plane includes management traffic, such as AP registration, configuration updates, and heartbeat messages, which are critical for the operation of the wireless network.

Option A, 'It protects management traffic between APs and Mobility Controllers (MCs) from eavesdropping,' is correct. CPSec uses certificate-based authentication and encryption (IPSec tunnels) to secure the control plane communication between APs and MCs. This ensures that management traffic, which includes sensitive information like configuration data and AP status, is encrypted and protected from eavesdropping by unauthorized parties on the network.

Option B, 'It prevents Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against Mobility Controllers' (MCs') control plane,' is incorrect. While CPSec enhances security by authenticating APs and encrypting traffic, it is not specifically designed to prevent DoS attacks. DoS attacks against the control plane are mitigated by other features, such as rate limiting or firewall policies on the MC.

Option C, 'It protects wireless clients' traffic, tunneled between APs and Mobility Controllers, from eavesdropping,' is incorrect. CPSec protects the control plane (management traffic), not the data plane (client traffic). Client traffic in a tunneled architecture (e.g., GRE tunnels) is protected by the client's wireless encryption (e.g., WPA3), not CPSec.

Option D, 'It prevents access from unauthorized IP addresses to critical services, such as SSH, on Mobility Controllers (MCs),' is incorrect. CPSec does not control access to services like SSH on the MC. Access to such services is managed by other features, such as access control lists (ACLs) or management authentication settings on the MC.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

'Control Plane Security (CPSec) enhances network security by protecting the management traffic between Access Points (APs) and Mobility Controllers (MCs). When CPSec is enabled, the control plane communication is secured using certificate-based authentication and IPSec encryption, preventing eavesdropping and ensuring that only authorized APs can communicate with the MC. This protects sensitive management data, such as AP configuration and status updates, from being intercepted.' (Page 392, CPSec Overview Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking CPSec Deployment Guide notes:

'CPSec secures the control plane by encrypting management traffic between APs and MCs, ensuring that attackers cannot eavesdrop on or tamper with this communication. It does not protect client data traffic, which is secured by wireless encryption protocols like WPA3.' (Page 8, CPSec Benefits Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, CPSec Overview Section, Page 392.

HPE Aruba Networking CPSec Deployment Guide, CPSec Benefits Section, Page 8.

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Answer : A, D

The scenario involves AOS-CX switches in a two-tier topology (access and core layers) using OSPF routing at the core. The goal is to prevent ARP poisoning attacks on user VLANs at the access layer switches, where end-user devices connect. ARP poisoning (also known as ARP spoofing) is an attack where a malicious device sends fake ARP messages to associate its MAC address with the IP address of another device (e.g., the default gateway), allowing the attacker to intercept traffic.

ARP Inspection (Dynamic ARP Inspection, DAI): This feature prevents ARP poisoning by validating ARP packets against a trusted database of IP-to-MAC bindings. On AOS-CX switches, ARP inspection uses the DHCP snooping binding table to verify that ARP messages come from legitimate devices. If an ARP packet does not match the binding table, it is dropped.

DHCPv4 Snooping: This feature protects against rogue DHCP servers and builds a binding table of legitimate IP-to-MAC mappings by snooping DHCP traffic. The binding table is used by ARP inspection to validate ARP packets. DHCP snooping must be enabled before ARP inspection can function effectively, as it provides the trusted data for validation.

Option A, 'ARP inspection,' is correct. ARP inspection (DAI) directly prevents ARP poisoning by ensuring that ARP packets are legitimate, making it a key technology for this purpose.

Option B, 'OSPF passive interface,' is incorrect. OSPF passive interface is used to prevent OSPF from sending routing updates on specific interfaces, typically to reduce routing protocol traffic on user-facing interfaces. It does not prevent ARP poisoning, which is a Layer 2 attack.

Option C, 'BPDU guard (protection),' is incorrect. BPDU guard protects against spanning tree protocol (STP) attacks by disabling a port if it receives BPDUs (e.g., from an unauthorized switch). It does not address ARP poisoning, which is unrelated to STP.

Option D, 'DHCPv4 snooping,' is correct. DHCP snooping is a prerequisite for ARP inspection, as it builds the binding table used to validate ARP packets. It also protects against rogue DHCP servers, which can indirectly contribute to ARP poisoning by assigning incorrect IP addresses.

Option E, 'BPDU filtering,' is incorrect. BPDU filtering prevents a port from sending or receiving BPDUs, which can be used to protect against STP attacks, but it does not prevent ARP poisoning.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

'To prevent ARP poisoning attacks on user VLANs, enable Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on access layer switches. DAI validates ARP packets against the DHCP snooping binding table to ensure they come from legitimate devices. Use the command ip arp inspection vlan <vlan-list> to enable DAI on the specified VLANs. DHCP snooping must be enabled first with dhcp-snooping and dhcp-snooping vlan <vlan-list> to build the binding table used by DAI.' (Page 145, ARP Inspection and DHCP Snooping Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

'DHCP snooping and ARP inspection work together to protect against Layer 2 attacks like ARP poisoning. DHCP snooping builds a trusted database of IP-to-MAC bindings, which ARP inspection uses to filter out malicious ARP packets.' (Page 146, Best Practices Section)

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HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, ARP Inspection and DHCP Snooping Section, Page 145.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Best Practices Section, Page 146.

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Answer : D

The Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer plays a crucial role within the Device Insight architecture by residing in the cloud and applying machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to the metadata sent by Collectors. This component of the architecture is responsible for analyzing vast amounts of data collected from the network to identify and classify devices accurately. By utilizing machine learning algorithms and crowdsourced input, the Device Insight Analyzer enhances the accuracy of device detection and classification, thereby improving the overall security and management of the network.

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Aruba ClearPass official documentation and whitepapers that detail the functionality and deployment of the Device Insight Analyzer.

Technical articles and presentations on network security solutions that discuss the use of machine learning and data analytics in device management.

Answer : C

The ArubaOS firewall determines which rules to apply to a specific client's traffic based on the rules in policies associated with the client's user role. User roles are a fundamental part of ArubaOS and the firewall policies they encompass. These roles contain policies that dictate permissions and restrictions for network traffic. When a client authenticates, it is assigned a role, and the firewall enforces the rules defined within that role for the client's traffic.

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ArubaOS firewall and user role configuration guides that explain the role-based access control and firewall policy enforcement.

Industry best practices for network access control that advocate for role-based enforcement mechanisms.